APIAPE: Agents of Private Interest, Architects of Public Erosion

Chris Penk: The Legal Technician of Control

From Military Discipline to Legal Deregulation

A former Navy officer turned property lawyer, now a central figure in developer-aligned lawmaking in Aotearoa.

Current Portfolios

• Minister for Building and Construction
• Minister for Land Information
• Minister for Veterans
• Minister for Small Business and Manufacturing
• Associate Minister of Agriculture (Horticulture)

Chris Penk operates through precision rather than spectacle. His influence is not loud, but it is structural. Through tightly drafted amendments and procedural reforms, he converts public rights and community participation into administrative steps — manageable, dismissible, and increasingly optional.

His flagship legislative efforts in building, infrastructure, and land administration are consistently framed as matters of “efficiency” and “streamlining.” In practice, they reduce independent oversight, narrow avenues for public input, and elevate private certification and executive discretion over democratic safeguards.

What is presented as technical reform is, in effect, a redistribution of power. Decision-making shifts away from communities and regulators and toward developers, certifiers, and central administrators. Risk follows the same path — landing not with those who design the system, but with homeowners, neighbours, and future occupants.

This is not accidental. It is methodical. Each provision is carefully shaped to appear neutral, necessary, and incremental. Taken together, they form a clear pattern: control exercised through law, and accountability diluted through design.

The Public Works (Critical Infrastructure) Amendment Bill

Penk’s most prominent legislative project, the Public Works (Critical Infrastructure) Amendment Bill, is promoted as a practical response to delays in delivering essential infrastructure. Its real effect is structural: it narrows consultation, weakens Treaty partnership obligations, and reframes democratic safeguards as inefficiencies to be bypassed¹.

The Bill enables state agencies and contractors to proceed with large-scale projects that permanently alter communities, land, and ecosystems, while significantly reducing the ability of affected people to influence outcomes. Public participation is compressed, and meaningful consent is replaced with procedural notice.

By labelling projects as “critical,” the legislation converts exceptional powers into routine practice. What is lost is not merely time or process, but the capacity of communities to defend their homes, waterways, and cultural relationships with land.

From Local Voices to Legal Loopholes

These amendments are not neutral or accidental. They represent deliberate political choices that expand executive discretion and corporate access while contracting democratic oversight¹.

Penk’s reforms consistently privilege speed and convenience for developers and the state over kaitiakitanga, community wellbeing, and long-term accountability. Once a project is administratively classified as “critical,” the threshold for public challenge effectively disappears.

“He calls it ‘resilience.’ In practice, it is the removal of the final checks on power.”
— APIAPE Analysis, 2025

The result is a legal environment where participation is conditional, opposition is procedural, and outcomes are increasingly predetermined. Democratic engagement remains in form, but not in substance.

Deregulation and the Real Costs: Penk’s Building Reforms

In a late-2024 interview on The Platform NZ with Michael Laws (watch here), Chris Penk outlined a significant policy shift: reducing council inspections in the building consent process and replacing them with self-certification by tradespeople and building companies².

Penk described the existing system as slow and costly, citing a 569-day average build timeline and arguing that transferring oversight from councils to private actors would lower costs and accelerate construction².

Around the same period, Penk initiated a review of insulation and energy-efficiency requirements in new housing, asserting that these standards were inflating build costs by tens of thousands of dollars³. Industry and public-interest groups, including the Green Building Council, warned that weakening these standards would entrench cold, inefficient housing and shift long-term energy and health costs onto future occupants³.

During the interview, critics — including Laws himself — pointed to the leaky homes crisis as the historical context for council caution. That failure arose from reduced oversight and fragmented accountability, ultimately leaving homeowners and councils to absorb billions in remediation costs².

Penk’s response is consistent across portfolios: oversight is framed as friction, and accountability is reframed as delay. His solution — private sign-off in place of independent inspection — mirrors the logic of the Public Works (Critical Infrastructure) Amendment Bill: remove public safeguards, insulate decision-makers, and rely on private assurance where public verification once stood.

“What Penk calls ‘streamlining’ is the removal of independent quality checks, combined with the quiet transfer of risk back onto the public when failure occurs.”
— APIAPE Analysis, 2025

Legislative Pattern: Licensing by Notice, Discipline by Process

The Building and Construction Sector (Strengthening Occupational Licensing Regimes) Amendment Bill is framed as a tidy technical upgrade. In substance, it expands administrative control through licensing mechanics, fast suspension pathways, and investigator-led findings that can reshape outcomes without a full hearing.

1) Automatic licensing creates a parallel gate into restricted work

The bill inserts and relies on the category of an “automatically licensed person” (Building Act 2004, section 7 amendment; new definition inserted by clause 4(1)). It then rewrites who may carry out or supervise restricted building work so that restricted work may be done or supervised not only by a licensed building practitioner, but also by an automatically licensed person treated as licensed under an order (replacement section 84 inserted by clause 6).

This widens access to restricted work through executive or administrative order-making, rather than the ordinary licensing pathway. It shifts the public assurance function away from clear licensing thresholds and toward conditional “treated as licensed” status.

2) Offences expand, but the real discretion sits with orders and classifications

The offence framework is rebuilt around whether an automatically licensed person is treated as licensed “of that kind” (Building Act 2004, section 85 replacement and insertions by clause 7, including new section 85(2A) and section 85(3A)). Section 86 is amended so the offence for engaging others depends on whether the engager knows the person is not properly licensed or treated as licensed for that specific restricted work (clause 8).

The practical effect is that the decisive question becomes the scope of the order that treats a person as licensed. That is a classification and paperwork question, not necessarily a competence-and-safety question. This is regulatory control by definition.

3) Levy, late fees, and suspension become compliance levers

The bill creates a levy payment obligation (new section 291A inserted by clause 10) and links non-compliance to suspension and eventual cancellation through a structured notice process (replacement section 303 inserted by clause 15; see section 303(1) to (5)).

The mechanism is strict: if the practitioner does not respond and pay within 20 working days, the Registrar must suspend licensing (section 303(3) inserted by clause 15). If the practitioner does not comply and pay late fees by the final due date, the Registrar must cancel licensing (section 303(5) inserted by clause 15). This turns licensing status into an ongoing administrative compliance trigger, not simply a competence safeguard.

4) Minimum standards enforcement shifts to mandatory suspension and cancellation

The bill replaces section 293 so that if the Registrar determines a licensed building practitioner no longer meets minimum standards, the Registrar must suspend licensing and then cancel if standards are not met by set deadlines (replacement section 293 inserted by clause 11; linked consequentially to section 294 by clause 12 and section 295 by clause 13).

This is a hard escalation model. It is presented as quality assurance, but it also centralises control in the Registrar’s determinations and in rules-based notice procedures.

5) Investigator findings become appealable decisions

The bill expands the definition of “decision” to include “a finding by an investigator” (Building Act 2004, section 282 amendment by clause 9(2)), then creates a new right of appeal against an investigator’s finding that a complaint should not be considered by the Board (section 330 amendment by clause 25, creating section 330(1)(b)).

The procedure for those appeals is altered so the Board may confirm the finding or send it back for reconsideration, or require appointment of a new investigator (section 335 amendment by clause 26 inserting sections 335(3A) and (3B)).

This sounds balanced, but it also formalises investigator power. A gatekeeping finding can now shape the pathway, workload, and practical outcomes before a full Board hearing occurs.

6) Public register becomes a reputational penalty layer

The register must record suspensions within the last 3 years, including the ground, period, and conditions for termination (section 301 replacement by clause 14). It may also record cancellations not linked to disciplinary reasons if the Registrar considers it appropriate (section 301(2)(c) inserted by clause 14).

This increases transparency in one sense. It also increases discretionary reputational power in the Registrar, including where cancellation is not disciplinary.

7) Complaint and investigation system is expanded and hardened

The bill replaces sections 315 and 316 to expand complaints, create investigator appointment requirements, and grant broad information-gathering and entry powers, including statutory declarations, document production notices, entry and inspection, and warrant-based entry for household units and marae (replacement provisions inserted by clause 17, including sections 316C to 316F and offences in sections 316G and 316H).

The bill also makes hearings public by default, with discretion to go private (new section 324A inserted by clause 24). This creates a public-facing disciplinary architecture, with privacy protected only where the Board chooses to protect it.

Summary: Penk’s governing style

Penk’s pattern is not loud ideology. It is administrative dominance through “neutral” mechanics: created categories, mandatory suspension ladders, penalties for non-response, expanded investigator roles, and discretionary register disclosures. The public is told this is professionalisation. The bill reads like a compliance machine that shifts risk downward and power upward.

The Self-Certification Bill: Liability Removed, Risk Reassigned

In late 2025, Chris Penk introduced the Building and Construction Sector (Self-certification by Plumbers and Drainlayers) Amendment Bill, promoted as an opt-in efficiency measure. In substance, the Bill removes independent verification and compels building consent authorities to treat private certificates as conclusive proof of compliance.

Where a building consent relies on self-certification, councils are legally required to accept a certificate of compliance issued by an approved self-certifying plumber or drainlayer as establishing compliance. Authorities are explicitly insulated from liability for relying on those certificates, while being prohibited from independently verifying or challenging them.

This is not administrative streamlining. It is a statutory reallocation of responsibility.

• Independent inspections are displaced — private certification becomes determinative, even where technical or public health risks exist.
• Regulatory liability is removed — councils are protected from claims arising from defects they are legally barred from interrogating.
• Risk is transferred to occupants — homeowners and renters bear the consequences when defects emerge years later, often after certifiers have exited the market.
• Scope is set by regulation, not Parliament — what qualifies as “self-certifiable” work is delegated to secondary legislation, allowing incremental expansion without primary scrutiny.

The structure recreates a familiar failure mode: professional self-assurance replacing public verification, followed by fragmented accountability when defects surface. New Zealand has experienced the costs of this model before.

“This is not efficiency. In law, it is forced acceptance of conflicted certification combined with the removal of public liability. That is not reform — it is risk laundering.”
— APIAPE Analysis, 2026

The Bill aligns precisely with Penk’s broader legislative pattern: independent checks are removed, trust in private actors is mandated, and the state is legally insulated from downstream consequences. When failure occurs, the public absorbs the cost — financially, structurally, and socially.

Part of a Broader Erosion

Chris Penk’s amendments are not isolated or accidental. They form part of a wider governing approach that treats community participation as friction, local democracy as delay, and public safeguards as expendable¹.

His Public Works (Critical Infrastructure) Amendment Bill and the self-certification regime for plumbers and drainlayers follow the same structural logic: remove independent oversight, mandate trust in private actors, and substitute public accountability with contractual or administrative assurance.

In each instance, the language of “efficiency” is used to justify the removal of checks, while “streamlining” becomes the mechanism by which risk is transferred away from the state. The outcome is a systematic narrowing of public voice and a legal insulation of decision-makers from the consequences of failure.

“This is not cautious reform. It is managed decline — executed through the lawyer’s pen.”
— APIAPE

The pattern is now unmistakable: responsibility is lifted from government institutions and reassigned to homeowners, renters, and communities — those with the least power to prevent harm and the greatest exposure when systems fail.

The Anzac Day Amendment Bill: Expanding Commemoration or Expanding the State?

In April 2025, Chris Penk introduced the Anzac Day Amendment Bill, presenting it as a respectful and inclusive update to the Anzac Day Act. The stated aim was to broaden recognition for New Zealanders who served in lesser-known or “warlike” conflicts, framed as a modest act of national remembrance.

Beneath this language, however, the Bill performs a quiet redefinition of Anzac Day itself. By expanding the categories of “recognised conflicts” and qualifying service, it blurs historical boundaries and shifts a day of reflection toward an open-ended, state-defined narrative of military engagement.

New Zealand already honours veterans through established, community-led ceremonies across the country. The Bill does not expand entitlements, address veteran welfare, or respond to persistent failures in care, including PTSD support and long-term reintegration. Instead, it consolidates the state’s authority to define history, formalise memory, and normalise future military participation under the banner of commemoration.

“We were already honouring our veterans. This ‘update’ is not about respect — it is about rewriting history for future use.”
— APIAPE Analysis, 2025

As with Penk’s other reforms, the pattern is familiar: language that reassures, paired with outcomes that expand state power and narrow civic agency. In the name of recognition, the Bill transforms a solemn, community-anchored day into an increasingly state-managed expression of military identity.

Passed with limited scrutiny and framed as common sense, the change carries long-term implications for how national memory is shaped and who controls it. In this respect, the Anzac Day Amendment Bill is not principally about veterans. It is about consolidating the state’s role in defining collective memory.

For a detailed rebuttal, see the full opposition statement: Opposition to the Anzac Day Amendment Bill .

What You Can Do

• Read the detailed opposition to the Public Works (Critical Infrastructure) Amendment Bill to understand how technical amendments can dismantle long-standing democratic safeguards.
• Share this dossier to support public memory and scrutiny: Chris Penk — APIAPE Exposé .
• Treat claims of “efficiency” and “streamlining” with caution. These terms are often used to justify the removal of independent oversight and public accountability.
• Read legislation beyond its framing language. Track where power moves, who carries risk, and who is insulated when systems fail.

References

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